AD-TRUST-04: No trusts should lack SID filtering (quarantine)
| ID | AD-TRUST-04 |
| Severity | High |
| Suite | Active Directory (on-premises) |
| Product | Active Directory |
| Feature | Trusts |
| Security area | External access and sharing |
| Resource type | Trust |
| User impact of fixing | Medium |
| Effort to fix | Medium |
| Framework controls | nist-800-53-r5:AC-4 Information Flow Enforcementnist-800-53-r5:SC-7 Boundary Protection |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1134.005 |
| Reads from | On-premises Active Directory |
What this checks and how to fix it
Section titled “What this checks and how to fix it”Trusts with weak SID filtering are a significant security risk:
- SID History Vulnerability: Attackers can exploit SID history to elevate privileges across trust boundaries
- Privilege Escalation Path: Compromised external accounts can gain access to privileged resources
- Audit Finding: Most security audits flag weak SID filtering on inter-forest trusts as high-risk
- Compliance Gap: Fails compliance requirements for many security frameworks
This test identifies external and forest trusts with weak SID filtering, enabling targeted remediation:
- External trusts are weak when the
QUARANTINED_DOMAINbit (0x4) is not set - Forest trusts are weak when the
TREAT_AS_EXTERNALbit (0x40) is set (SID history enabled) - Intra-forest (parent-child) trusts are excluded because they do not support quarantine
- MIT Kerberos realm trusts are excluded as SID filtering does not apply to them
Control Type
Section titled “Control Type”Detective
Security Recommendation
Section titled “Security Recommendation”Immediate Actions:
- Review each trust with weak SID filtering to determine if it can be strengthened
- For external trusts: enable SID filtering (
netdom trust /quarantine:yes) - For forest trusts: disable SID history (
netdom trust /enablesidhistory:no) - Test applications that rely on cross-trust authentication before making changes
Long-term Strategy:
- Replace external trusts with forest trusts where possible
- Implement selective authentication for sensitive resources
- Regularly audit trust configurations
- Document any trusts that must remain weak with business justification
Commands to Strengthen SID Filtering:
# External trust — enable quarantine (SID filtering)netdom trust <TrustingDomain> /domain:<TrustedDomain> /quarantine:yes
# Forest trust — disable SID historynetdom trust <TrustingDomain> /domain:<TrustedDomain> /enablesidhistory:noHow the Test Works
Section titled “How the Test Works”This test derives trust classification and SID filtering status from the trustAttributes LDAP attribute and trustType:
- External trusts:
trustTypein1,2andtrustAttributesdoes not haveFOREST_TRANSITIVE(0x8) orWITHIN_FOREST(0x20) - Forest trusts:
trustAttributeshasFOREST_TRANSITIVE(0x8) - Weak external trusts:
QUARANTINED_DOMAIN(0x4) is not set - Weak forest trusts:
TREAT_AS_EXTERNAL(0x40) is set (SID history enabled)
The test displays:
- Target domain of the trust
- Trust direction (Inbound, Outbound, or Bidirectional)
- Trust type (External Downlevel, Domain Uplevel, MIT Kerberos, or DCE)
- Whether the trust is a forest or external trust
- The reason for weak SID filtering
Related Tests
Section titled “Related Tests”Test-MtAdTrustQuarantinedCount- Count of quarantined vs non-quarantined external/forest trustsTest-MtAdTrustInterForestCount- Identifies external trusts that should be quarantinedTest-MtAdTrustDetails- Complete trust configuration details
Related links
Section titled “Related links”- Microsoft Learn: Security considerations for trusts
- ANSSI Active Directory checkpoints: Unfiltered outbound domain trust relationship
Mito check. Author: soulemike. Open-source licences.
Open-source licences. CIS Benchmark material © Center for Internet Security, Inc.; CISA SCuBA baselines are public domain (CC0).
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